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The conclusions given above have been reached by an attempt at logical analysis of value concepts. Perhaps this method by itself has given sufficient proof. Additional proofs can be given later by showing that the present hypothesis is more fruitful than other hypotheses, both in introducing order and system into the general science of value and also in furnishing a tool for the inductive study of human value judgments and value facts.

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### REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*Philosophical Opinion in America.* GEORGE SANTAYANA. *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. VIII. London: Oxford University Press. 1918. Pp. 13.

Professor Santayana's address to the British Academy—the fact that Mr. Santayana is not really a professor any more would be an entirely irrelevant detail were it not so regrettable—deserves the appreciative attention of all who study American imagination in its more serious moods. America has, as it should, both the diffidence and the naïve confidence appropriate to a people just emerging from the awkward age. The problem of emancipation recurs for every vigorous generation and the vitality of American philosophy has appeared in nothing more clearly than in the will to be independent of what Mr. Santayana has excellently called “the genteel tradition.” To the extent that our culture was transplanted from Europe, our philosophy, as part of it, is rooted there; and in so far as the new climate has been really new, the fruits show features that are novel and original, and, no doubt, what old gardeners call a little wild. How has migration to the new world affected philosophical ideas? This is, as Mr. Santayana observes, a question curious in itself and one that may become important in the future; it is the topic with which his address is primarily concerned.

“At first sight we might be tempted, perhaps, to dismiss this question altogether, on the ground that no such effect is discernible. For what do we find in America in the guise of philosophy? In the background the same Protestant theology as in Europe and the same Catholic theology; on the surface, the same adoption of German idealism, the same vogue of evolution, the same psychology becoming metaphysics, and lately the same revival of a mathematical or logical realism. In no case has the first expression of these various tendencies appeared in America, and no original system that I

know of has arisen there. It would seem, then, that in philosophy, as in letters generally, polite America has continued the common tradition of Christendom, in paths closely parallel to those followed in England; and that modern speculation, which is so very sensitive to changed times, is quite indifferent to distinctions of place."

This is true, however, only of "*polite America*," America of the Puritan tradition. But life here is colored by other things. "The horde of immigrants eagerly accepts the external arrangements and social spirit of American life, but never hears of its original austere principles, or relegates them to the same willing oblivion as it does the constraints which it has just escaped—Jewish, Irish, German, Italian, or whatever they may be. We should be seriously deceived if we overlooked for a moment the curious and complex relation between these two Americas." The millions who have come here seeking the land of their hopes have thrown the philosophy of puritan values badly out of joint. Whether we like it or not, there has grown up a democracy of speculation. "Every system was met with a frank gaze. 'Come on,' people seemed to say to it, 'show us what you are good for. We accept no claims; we ask for no credentials; we just give you a chance. Plato, the Pope, and Mrs. Eddy shall have one vote each.'"

Yet the very struggle for emancipation makes new theories, in so far as they are ways of escape, functions of the old ones, and thus much supposed independence is largely imaginary. Escape from a tradition comes not in fighting it but in forgetting it, and the metaphysics of theological romanticism have, Mr. Santayana thinks, been largely forgotten by the younger American philosophers. whose style is, indeed, "deplorable," and who put up openmindedly with "being toasted only on one side." But it has been for most of us harder to forget idealism than Mr. Santayana suggests, and the concern with various problems of "consciousness," problems of "knowledge," problems of existence, is a proof that emancipation has been less thorough than, theoretically, it ought to have been.

"It may seem a strange Nemesis that a critical philosophy, which on principle reduces everything to the consciousness of it, should end by reducing consciousness itself to other things; yet the path of this boomerang is not hard to trace." Mr. Santayana traces it with his usual clarity. It leads to the conclusion that "Things are just what they seem to be, and to say they are consciousness or compose a consciousness is absurd. The so-called appearances, according to a perfected criticism of knowledge, are nothing private or internal; they are merely those portions of external objects which from time to time impress themselves on somebody's organs of sense and are responded to by his nervous system.

"Such is the doctrine of the new American realist, in whose devoted persons the logic of idealism has worked itself out and appropriately turned idealism itself into its opposite. Consciousness, they began by saying, is merely a stream of ideas; but then ideas are merely the parts of objects which happen to appear to a given person; but again a person (for all you or he can discover) is nothing but his body and those parts or other objects which appear to him; and finally to appear, in any discoverable sense, can not be to have a ghostly sort of mental existence, but merely to be reacted upon by an animal body. Thus we come to the conclusion that objects alone exist, and that consciousness is a name for certain segments or groups of these objects." Thus, as Mr. Santayana puts it, "to deny consciousness is to deny a prerequisite to the obvious, and to leave the obvious standing alone." And the same psychological criticism viewed from a slightly different angle is found "transforming the notion of truth much as it has transformed the notion of consciousness."

Mr. Santayana does not explicitly say so, but he makes it clear, I think, that the cloud of ambiguities that has darkened the discussions of "pragmatism" is due very largely to the unhappy circumstance that this discussion was supposed to be about the notion or meaning or concept of "truth." The word is, of course, ambiguous, having either the logical or the psychological emphasis. According to Mr. Santayana's definition, "the truth properly means the sum of all true propositions, what omniscience would assert, the whole ideal system of qualities and relations which the world has exemplified or will exemplify. The truth is all things seen under the form of eternity." On the other hand, the psychological criticism has given the word an improper and subjective meaning.

If, instead of being phrased as a discussion about truth, which it never was, the controversy over pragmatism had been more clearly about the reasons for regarding specific propositions as true or as false, and the ways of arriving at propositions that can be labeled either true or false, a whole chapter of academic misunderstanding might, we may hope, have been avoided. That is, the controversy was really about scientific method and the handling of evidence. The best definition of pragmatism the reviewer has come across is one by Professor Boodin in his book on the subject. He defines pragmatism, if I remember rightly, as "scientific method conscious of its own procedure." And this way of putting the matter agrees, I think, but I am not quite sure, with what Mr. Santayana means by the following: "Now there is a problem, not impossible to confuse with the problem of correctness in ideas, with which psychological criticism can really deal: it is the question of the relation between a sign and

the thing signified. Of this relation a genuinely empirical account can be given: both terms are objects of experience, present or eventual, and the passage between them is made in time by an experienced transition. Nor need the signs which lead to a particular object be always the same, or of one sort: an object may be designated and foretold unequivocally by a verbal description, without any direct image, or by images now of one sense and now of another, or by some external relation, such as its place, or by its proper name, if it possesses one; and these designations all convey knowledge of it, and may be true signs, if in yielding to their suggestion we are brought eventually to the object meant.

"Here, if I am not mistaken, is the genuine application of what the pragmatists call their theory of truth. It concerns merely what links a sign to the thing signified, and renders it a practical substitute for the same."

The spirit of all this is, Mr. Santayana points out, not entirely negative. It is full of the negations of escape, but it is positive, progressive and assertive. "It is very close to nature, as the lover of nature understands the word."

Mr. Santayana sees pragmatism too much, I think, in the very human but rather impulsive exposition of James, whereas the point of view which that word suggests to-day in America is the much more critical and analytic position that found expression in Chicago. It is difficult, to be sure, to contemplate Chicago under the form of eternity, and this may have something to do with the nuance of Mr. Santayana's emphasis. He says, speaking of the spirit of all the radical views referred to: "It is very sympathetic to science, in so far as science is a personal pursuit, and a personal experience, rather than a body of doctrine with moral implications." If, however, we restrict the application of this sentence to the position of the most distinguished living exponent of pragmatism in America, we must reverse the statement and say it is very sympathetic to science in so far as science is a body of doctrine with moral implications, and not a personal pursuit and a personal experience.

But as for the way in which the new world has affected philosophy. It has furthered the emancipation from conventional categories, and it has favored the undogmatic "assemblage and mutual confrontation of all sorts of ideas." Philosophy can not conceivably be, not for a long time at least, in America, the metaphysics of a genteel tradition. "It is time for it to become less solemn and more serious."

WENDELL T. BUSH